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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C 20505

Critical Intelligence Problems Committee

DCI/ICS 84-3706
11 January 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members, Terrorism Review Working Group

SUBJECT: Analyst Conferencing Network

1. Attached is the set of requirements that I transcribed from our meeting yesterday. Please review it and let me know if I have done violence to your specifications.

2. I met with communicators yesterday from NSA and DIA. They concluded that the above requirements can be met and an initial operating capability can be achieved within two weeks of a go-ahead. It would consist of a voice-and-keyboard connection between the NSOC and NMIC. I met with communicators from State and CIA today to determine whether their ops centers can be included in that IOC. Progress beyond IOC will be incremental, depending on such things as running cable to analysts spaces, getting transmission capacity to some of the more remote sites, such as Henderson Hall, etc. Nevertheless, the communicators I spoke to yesterday estimated that the entire net could be operating in six months, assuming our priority is high enough. My plans are as follows:


- a. Get your coordination on the attached.
- b. Arrange a demonstration of the analyst net for the Working Group at NSA. Friday is target date.
- c. Get your ideas on how this net should operate, what information should be exchanged, and anything else you regard as germane.
- d. Arrange meetings among each of you, your respective communicators, and the NSA technical people to iron out details. We would put in writing what each agency's responsibilities to this system development would be.
- e. Present all of this in a report to the CIPC who will decide whether, or how much, of this proposal they want to proceed with. The CIPC will presumably then make a recommendation to the DCI.

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3. The CIPC is next scheduled to meet 23 January. The above must be done by then. Consequently, the other items of business which were mentioned in Miss Page's memo to the CIPC dated 4 January, will have to be put off temporarily.

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Attachment: As stated



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Distribution: DCI/ICS 84-3706

1 to each of the WG Members

1 - ES/CIPC

1 - CIPC/[redacted]

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1 - ICS Registry

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DCI TERRORISM ANALYST NETWORK

CONCEPT OF OPERATION

MISSION: Facilitate analyst-to-analyst communications.

OPERATION: Conversational. Informal, non-record. Not to be used in lieu of NOIWON for highly time-sensitive situations nor to preempt restricted dissemination.

MODES: Order of preference (1) voice over keyboard, (2) voice only, (3) keyboard only.

SECURITY: TS/SI/TK. No electronic connections to incoming message systems anticipated.

TERM OF OPERATION: This is an interim solution, until DESIST comes on line circa. 1984-85.

MEMBERSHIP: DIA, CIA, NSA, State, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, FBI, JSOC, Secret Service.

LOCATIONS: DIA: NMIC and OS-1 spaces
CIA: Ops Center, DDO space, DDI space
State: Ops Center plus two other spaces
Plus at least one terminal for each of the remaining members

MANAGEMENT: NSA would serve as technical manager. No substantive manager would exist. The net would operate in that respect similar to the NOIWON. Normal management relationships would obtain.

STAFFING: Each agency will provide a 24-hour watch over its respective terminal. Some agencies will provide that watch with a terrorism specialist. Others will use regular watch standers with duty specialists on call.

DISSEMINATION: A communications link to specific threat sites could prove useful under certain circumstances. Provisions to incorporate such a link should not be ruled out, but are not a specific requirement at this time.

NOTES:

1. Other technical solutions may exist:
 - accelerate DESIST teleconferencing capability
 - use Pegasus/DESIST terminal in lieu of IBM PC terminals
2. Expectations for the efficacy of this system should not be unreasonably high. It will not solve our terrorism problem. It will only enable us to refine the low-grade one more effectively.

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